Enth.: Dugoald Stewart's account of Adam Smith / ed. by I.S. Ross.

The dominant response to this problem of the criterion focuses on the alleged requirement that we need to know a belief source is reliable in order for us to acquire knowledge by that source. Let us call this requirement, “The KR principle”.

Since virtually every mathematical theory can be interpreted in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, it is a foundation for mathematics. There are other foundations, such as alternate set theories, higher-order logic, ramified type theory, and category theory. Whether set theory is the right foundation for mathematics depends on what a foundation is for. One purpose is to provide the ultimate metaphysical basis for mathematics. A second is to assure the basic epistemological coherence of all mathematical knowledge. A third is to serve mathematics, (...) by lending insight into the various fields and suggesting fruitful techniques of research. A fourth purpose of a foundation is to provide an arena for exploring relations and interactions between mathematical fields. While set theory does better with regard to some of these and worse with regard to others, it has become the de facto arena for deciding questions of existence, something one might expect of a foundation. Given the different goals, there is little point to determining a single foundation for all of mathematics. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that standards, which are typically social in nature, play a role in determining whether a subject has knowledge. While the argument focuses on standards that pertain to reasoning, I also consider whether there are similar standards for memory and perception.Ultimately, I argue that the standards are context sensitive and, as such, we must view attributions of knowledge as indexical. I exploit similarities between this view and a version of the relevant alternatives reply to skepticism in (...) order to defend this reply against the objection that it is ad hoc. (shrink)

My dissertation consists of two main parts. In the first part, I begin by assuming the plausibility of the libertarian thesis that agents sometimes could have done otherwise than they did given the very same history of the world. In light of this assumption, I undertake to develop a model of agency which does not employ the concept of agent-causation. My agency theory is developed in three main stages: I suggest that any agency theory must satisfy four desiderata: It must (...) adequately account for the freedom and responsibility of human agents. It must provide an adequate answer to the question of what distinguishes human actions from mere happenings. It must adequately account for the epistemological fact that human agents have an immediate and nonobservational awareness of their actions. It should have the support of a respectable philosophical tradition. I argue that agent-causation provides a theory of agency which fails adequately to satisfy these four desiderata. I claim both that human actions are uncaused exercisings by agents of their powers and that human agents typically act for reasons. I maintain that the central issue dividing agency theorists and nonagency theorists is whether reasons for performing actions cause the latter. I maintain that the sense of 'because' in 'I did x because...' is not causal in nature, but teleological. ;Having developed my model of agency, in the second part of my dissertation I investigate what are some of the paradigmatic actions human agents perform. I claim that bodily actions, such as moving an arm, are psychological in nature. Essential to my argument is the concept of a body-image. A normal agent 'feels' as if she is present in her physical arm. The way a normal agent feels is revealed in the case of a phantom limb. The subject of a phantom arm feels as if her amputated physical arm is still there and she can move while feeling armishly. I maintain that the bodily action of moving an arm is the agent's movement as a psychological arm-image of her physical arm, whether the physical arm is present or not. (shrink)

At the beginning of Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik [1884], Frege observes that “it is in the nature of mathematics to prefer proof, where proof is possible”. This, of course, is true, but thinkers differ on why it is that mathematicians prefer proof. And what of propositions for which no proof is possible? What of axioms? This talk explores various notions of self-evidence, and the role they play in various foundational systems, notably those of Frege and Zermelo. I argue that both (...) programs are undermined at a crucial point, namely when self-evidence is supported by holistic and even pragmatic considerations. (shrink)

In his Target Article, Terrence Deacon develops simple models that assist in understanding the role of RNA in the origins of life. However, his models fail to adequately represent an important evolutionary dynamic. Central to this dynamic is the selection that impinges on RNA molecules in the context of their association with proto-metabolisms. This selection shapes the role of RNA in the emergence of life. When this evolutionary dynamic is appropriately taken into account, it predicts a role for RNA that (...) is consistent with the Managed-Metabolism Hypothesis about the origins of life, and inconsistent with Deacon’s account. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Locke Butler Reid Hume Kant.

Business majors were tested for their attitudes toward the teaching of business ethics in university business education. Respondents indicated that they considered ethics an important part of a business curriculum and that they preferred integrating ethics into a number of different courses rather than taking a separate compulsory or elective ethics course. Ethical business practices were seen by respondents as increasing profit and return on investment and creating a positive work environment and public perception of the organization.

What is honor? Is it the same as reputation? Or is it rather a sentiment? Is it a character trait, like integrity? Or is it simply a concept too vague or incoherent to be fully analyzed? In the first sustained comparative analysis of this elusive notion, Frank Stewart writes that none of these ideas is correct. Drawing on information about Western ideas of honor from sources as diverse as medieval Arthurian romances, Spanish dramas of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, (...) and the writings of German jurists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and comparing the European ideas with the ideas of a non-Western society—the Bedouin—Stewart argues that honor must be understood as a right, basically a right to respect. He shows that by understanding honor this way, we can resolve some of the paradoxes that have long troubled scholars, and can make sense of certain institutions that have not hitherto been properly understood. Offering a powerful new way to understand this complex notion, _Honor_ has important implications not only for the social sciences but also for the whole history of European sensibility. (shrink)

To this circumstance is probably to be ascribed the little progress, which has hitherto been made in the PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND ; a, science, ...

The presumption of innocence has often been understood as a doctrine that can be explained primarily by instrumental concerns relating to accurate fact-finding in the criminal trial and that has few if any implications outside the trial itself. In this paper, I argue, in contrast, that in a liberal legal order everyone has a right to be presumed innocent simply in virtue of being a person. Every person has a right not to be subjected to criminal punishment unless and until (...) he or she has done something that is criminally wrong. Since disagreements about allegations of criminal wrongdoing are inevitable, the liberal legal order requires a process for determining whether wrongdoing has occurred. In order to preserve the right not to be punished without wrongdoing, the accused person must be presumed innocent throughout this process. The presumption of innocence is therefore as much a basic human right as, for example, the right to bodily integrity or the right to freedom of expression. Specifications of and limitations on the right should therefore be justified not primarily in terms of their instrumental effectiveness in fact-finding or crime control but in terms of the role of the criminal process in a liberal legal order. I consider some implications of this view of the presumption of innocence for the pre-trial process and for substantive criminal law. I argue that the presumption of innocence, understood as a basic human right, should condition the entire pre-trial process; it has, however, minimal implications for the definition of offences. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction Defining Terms: Relativism, Pluralism, Tolerance What Is Logic? One Route to Pluralism: Logic ‐ as ‐ Model The Boundary Between Logical and Non ‐ Logical Terminology Vagueness Relativity to Structure References.

The idea that logic and reasoning are somehow related goes back to antiquity. It clearly underlies much of the work in logic, as witnessed by the development of computability, and formal and mechanical deductive systems, for example. On the other hand, a platitude is that logic is the study of correct reasoning; and reasoning is cognitive if anything Is. Thus, the relationship between logic, computation, and correct reasoning makes an interesting and historically central case study for mechanism. The purpose of (...) this article is to begin the articulation of this relationship, pointing out its sources and its limitations. (shrink)

First published in 1993. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The paper arises from a shared event that turned into an experience: the finding of a childlike piece of paper on our way to a conference about philosophy in schools and how it affects our educational ideas and research practices on listening to children. Triggered by the question of what it means to listen, we are led to the exercise of self-questioning inspired by some of the authors that have already written about the topic, specifically in the context of the (...) community of philosophical enquiry. The thinking unfolds with the telling of the story about the found piece of paper, crossing different layers of questioning and trying to keep the enquiry open for the readers: what is it that we do not know about listening to children? And to what extent might that, which we do not know, be the cause of biased and adultist practices? Is it necessary to return to what philosophy is and where one can find it inside the school environment? Is it already there when the adults arrive? Are we not listening to it? Or are there specific places for philosophical conversations, such as the classroom? Is philosophy also invited to the margins of those spaces? Who decides what counts as philosophical? It is not about answering questions and giving closure to our concerns as educators and researchers, but rather sharing with the readers how even in the least suspected place - an academic event about bringing philosophy to school - one might still not be listening to children. In returning to this self-questioning movement, we want to echo some of the troubling in the thinking and practices of listening in the so-called movement of Philosophy for/with Children: this for/with phenomenon, its politics and relations; some of the assumptions that might be present in the dilemmas in practice for educators and researchers; but also its aesthetics resonances, the sheer beauty of troubling, the (out of) tune of self-questioning, the questions it raises for us as researchers and the space of doubting and uncertainty it offers, like a hesitation or a breathing space. And perhaps, we wonder, it is in-between spaces, in its cracks and transitions, that important things can find their way into our thinking and conversations about childhood. Just like a piece of paper in a hotel room. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Descartes Malebranche and Leibniz.

Responding to the invitation of this special issue of Childhood and Philosophy this paper considers the ethos of facilitation in philosophical enquiry with children, and the spatial-temporal order of the community of enquiry. Within the Philosophy with Children movement, there are differences of thinking and practice on ‘facilitation’ in communities of philosophical enquiry, and we suggest that these have profound implications for the political agency of children. Facilitation can be enacted as a chronological practice of progress and development that works (...) against child, in terms of political agency. This paper theorises practices of facilitation grounded in philosophies of childhood that assume listening to child/ren as equals, as already able to philosophise, and against sameness. We explore the political and ethical implications of the radical posthumanist reconfiguration of the ‘zipped’ body in the light of including the disciplinary, imaginative and enabling energies of chronological time through the concept now/ness. We shift from ethics to ethos, and from ‘zipped’ to ‘unzipped’ bodies, through the notion of affect to explore the temporal and spatial dimensions of facilitation in Philosophy with Children and children’s political agency. We re-turn to David McKee’s Not Now Bernard, getting ‘inside the text’, and attending to the postponement of equality in Philosophy with Children. (shrink)

The mental competence of people requesting aid-in-dying is a key issue for the how the law responds to cases of assisted suicide. A number of cases from around the common law world have highlighted the importance of competence in determining whether assistants should be prosecuted, and what they will be prosecuted for. Nevertheless, the law remains uncertain about how competence should be tested in these cases. This article proposes a test of competence that is based on the existing common law (...) but which is tailored to cases of assisted suicide. The test will help doctors, other health professionals and lawyers determine whether the suicidal person was able to competently request assistance. Such knowledge will help to reduce some of the current uncertainty about criminal liability in cases of assisted suicide. (shrink)

This article explores the context for the accompanying suite of papers on creating and sustaining democratic spaces in education. Prompted by the centenary of Summerhill, the internationally famous democratic school founded in Suffolk, England, in 1921, by A.S. Neill, this collection of papers explores and broadens out the central questions at the heart of experiments in democratic education. We suggest that, at a time of distrust in and questioning of the central institutions of democratic government, and in the wake of (...) challenges to the mainstream system of state schooling, these questions are more relevant than ever. We argue that detailed attention to the everyday practice of creating democratic spaces in a variety of educational and social contexts can highlight the myriad ways in which educators, students, families and communities can keep democratic values and principles alive, thereby enriching our discussions about the meaning and value of democratic education. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Simple View The Teleological View The Qualitative View Objections Concluding Remarks Works cited.

Several defences, viewed in this study as specifications or 'offspring' of the 'parent' greater-good defence, have been formulated in response to the charge that Christianity is untenable because God's existence is incompatible with evil's existence. In this first book-length study of the parent defence, Stewart begins with careful definitions of the omni-attributes central to the dispute: omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence. The parent defence is traced to tenets of theism and variant accounts of the defence considered. Plantinga's modal free-will defence and (...) Hick's and Yandell's soul-growth specifications are carefully analyzed and several difficulties resolved. An original formulation of a redemption specification and an original account of the origin of moral evil are offered. Stewart argues that the defences are rightly viewed as a family of defences falling under the greater-good heading, and that they comprise a complementary apologetic complex that refutes the claim of inconsistency. (shrink)

The formulations of the argument for atheism from evil are quite formal in nature. One “solution” to the problem of evil would be to deny that evil exists. But Clive Staples Lewis, a philosopher, would have none of this. He believed that pain is intrinsically evil, and it is its evilness that ultimately gives rise to the problem of evil. Lewis' thoughts about pain and God's reason is the subject of this chapter. The chapter also discusses Lewis's treatment of the (...) problem of evil. Lewis held that the justification for allowing human beings to experience pain is ultimately connected to the good of perfect happiness, where the enjoyment of it can be had only if persons have the freedom to choose how they will become happy, to choose to die or not to die to self. Thus, Lewis articulated his theodicy in terms of the actual individual and his or her happiness. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Evil and Contemporary Philosophical Orthodoxy Defense versus Theodicy The Free Will Defense Life's Purpose and Perfect Happiness Developing a Theodicy Adams and Horrendous Evil Plantinga's “ O Felix Culpa ” Theodicy Beasts and the Problem of Evil References.

This paper has arisen directly from the authors’ experiences of leading professional development for teachers in Philosophy with Children (P4C), a well-established approach to teaching that seeks to foster philosophical questioning, critical thinking, reasoning and dialogue. The paper expresses deep concern about the anxiety shown by many teachers regarding discussion of controversial issues in the classroom, and some teachers’ avoidance of open-ended dialogue about works of children’s literature that might touch on taboo subjects. The authors suggest that this is indicative (...) of a desire for risk-free teaching and is a form of censorship that marginalises children and limits their learning and academic freedom. The exercise of such avoidance and control reduces the potential for schools to become more democratic institutions. Drawing directly on their practice of working philosophically with children in school, as well as on philosophical and other sources, the authors of the paper offer a range of arguments about the processes of education to support the case for challenging such forms of censorship and risk avoidance. (shrink)

Much has been written since Clive Staples Lewis' day about belief that God exists (belief in the existence of God). It would be many years before Lewis became a theist. But what he thought in 1918 indicates that he would first resolve the issue of supernaturalism as opposed to naturalism in terms of his own self, before becoming a theistic supernaturalist. The distinctions between naturalism, supernaturalism, and theistic supernaturalism are reflected in Lewis's frequent references to those who believed England and (...) Europe were reverting to paganism. Having claimed that God is like the author of a play rather than a character in it, Lewis acknowledged that some would raise an objection. This chapter discusses this objection in detail. It also discusses Lewis's argument for the existence of a Creator, whom we call “God”. The chapter further explains some points to note with regard to the argument. (shrink)

The long tradition of Kierkegaard studies has made it impossible for individual scholars to have a complete overview of the vast field of Kierkegaard research. The large and ever increasing number of publications on Kierkegaard in the languages of the world can be simply bewildering even for experienced scholars. The present work constitutes a systematic bibliography which aims to help students and researchers navigate the seemingly endless mass of publications. The volume is divided into two large sections. Part I, which (...) covers Tomes I-V, is dedicated to individual bibliographies organized according to specific language. This includes extensive bibliographies of works on Kierkegaard in some 41 different languages. Part II, which covers Tomes VI-VII, is dedicated to shorter, individual bibliographies organized according to specific figures who are in some way relevant for Kierkegaard. The goal has been to create the most exhaustive bibliography of Kierkegaard literature possible, and thus the bibliography is not limited to any specific time period but instead spans the entire history of Kierkegaard studies. (shrink)

In the United States, only 6% of the 1.5 million faculty in degree-granting postsecondary institutions is Black. Research shows that, while many institutions tout the idea of diversity recruitment, not much progress has been made to diversify faculty ranks, especially at research-intensive institutions. We're Not Ok shares the experiences of Black faculty to take the reader on a journey, from the obstacles of landing a full-time faculty position through the unique struggles of being a Black educator at a predominantly white (...) institution, along with how these deterrents impact inclusion, retention, and mental health. The book provides practical strategies and recommendations for graduate students, faculty, staff, and administrators, along with changemakers, to make strides in diversity, equity, and inclusion. More than a presentation of statistics and anecdotes, it is the start of a dialogue with the intent of ushering actual change that can benefit Black faculty, their students, and their institutions. (shrink)

Stewart Candlish; V*—Inner and Outer Basic Action, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 84, Issue 1, 1 June 1984, Pages 83–102, https://doi.org/10.10.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Ghost in the Machine Objection The Private Language Argument Ockham's Razor and Identity Argument from Neural Dependence Arguments from Personal Identity Argument from Evolution.

This chapter discusses Clive Staples Lewis's views about the purpose of life. Lewis himself believed that nature does not have its own purposes. Instead, he thought God created the natural world, and the human beings which inhabit it, for a purpose. Lewis believed the purpose of life is that we experience a happiness that he variably described as eternal, infinite, complete, or perfect. The experience of this happiness is the life of the blessed. Lewis thought happiness is experiencing pleasure, where (...) experiencing pleasure is the purpose for which God created us. A hedonist about happiness is someone who believes not only that pleasure is intrinsically good but also holds that pain is intrinsically evil. To say that the experience of pain is intrinsically evil is to say that pain is evil and does not derive its evilness from its relationship to anything else. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Soul and the Brain The Soul and Scientific Methodology Soul‐Body Causal Interaction and the Conservation of Energy.